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Interview
GENERAL LEE'S ARMY: FROM VICTORY TO COLLAPSE
Glatthaar, Joseph T.
Spring 2008
Interview with Joseph T. Glatthaar
Interviewed by Christopher Childers
Civil War Book Review (CWBR): In General Lee's Army, you have
combined the use of personal diaries and letters with a carefully developed data
sample to gain a better understanding of the makeup of Lee's army. How did you
conceptualize this project? Did the mixture of traditional archival work and
statistical sampling present any special challenges in writing this book?
Joseph T. Glatthaar (JTG): As far back as 1985, when I published The
March to the Sea and Beyond on Sherman's army, I employed some statistics. In
this book, I wanted to generate more statistics to understand these soldiers, their
backgrounds, and their wartime experiences. By relying on letters and diaries
alone, it was too easy to present soldiers' attitudes in a light that was not
reflective of their overall sentiments. Historians need statistical evidence to
buttress arguments about soldiers' opinions and feelings. I think a blending of
qualitative with quantitative evidence is the best means of researching a project
like Lee's army.
Certainly the compilation of data was complicated and lengthy, but writing
it up in a narrative fashion was an unusual challenge. I did not want to
overwhelm the reader with statistics. Nor did I want to turn off readers. When
many people see statistics, their eyes roll into the back of their heads. I did not
want to intimidate or discourage readers by tossing into the text all sorts of
statistics. The key was introducing them gently, in ways that people could
envision easily. Instead of writing 62%, I would phrase it, slightly more than
three of ever five.
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I also knew the book needed a rough chronological flow but it also had to
include topical chapters. I had to plot the book carefully.
CWBR: Many historians have criticized the Confederate army structure (and
for that matter, its Union counterpart) for infusing the high command with
political appointments. You seem to downplay this concern. How did politics
affect the army's command structure?
JTG: High command has always been infused with politics. These were
appointments made by politicians. West Pointers received nominations from
politicians and used their connections for choice assignments, promotions, and
the like. For that matter, politicians enjoyed associations with high-ranking
military officials and got relatives on generals' staffs, to give just two examples.
It cut both ways.
Many politicians felt that service in leadership positions in the national or
state government offered experience that would prove valuable in wartime. They
believed that prewar Regular Army duty in an infantry or cavalry company or an
artillery battery did not qualify an individual any better to hold a commission as
a general officer than did extensive political service.
Many officers in Lee's army, including those who had come from the
Regular Army, attempted to use their political connections to advance in rank
and responsibility. Lee was very careful about getting individuals whom he
trusted in positions of great responsibility.
CWBR: How did the demographic makeup of General Lee's Army change
throughout the war's course? What does your research suggest about the old
argument that the Confederate war effort constituted a rich man's war and a poor
man's fight?
JTG: There was a surprising degree of consistency among soldiers who
entered the war in 1861 and 1862. The median degree of wealth placed them
solidly in the middle class. Compared to the South in 1860, a much high
percentage of soldiers in Lee's army (both officers and enlisted men) came from
slaveholding households. The actual and sample numbers tapered off for men
who first entered the army in 1863 and 1864, but if we combine those two year
groups, we find more extremes--older and younger men, more rich and more
poor--, but backgrounds quite similar to the soldiers of 1861 or 1862.
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The fact is that rich or well-to-do men were overrepresented in Lee's army,
deserted less frequently (this is understandable, because war's hardships affect
poorer people more severely), and were more likely to be killed in action than
their poorer comrades.
CWBR: In one section, you explain that Confederate soldiers saw their
Yankee counterparts as invaders, vandals, mercenaries, hirelings, or Hessians.
How did Southerners arrive at these conclusions about their former countrymen?
In what way did these sorts of beliefs justify the brutality of civil war?
JTG: Confederate soldiers could not understand why their former
countrymen would attempt to subjugate them. They separated from the Union to
preserve their civil liberties. Confederates could not imagine that northerners
would voluntarily join the Union army to oppress them out of some sound
ideology, so they assumed Federals must be doing it for pay. Those were
mercenaries or hirelings. Foreign-born soldiers were Hessians. Union armies
penetrated the Confederacy, threatening the homes, property, and loved ones.
Confederates saw them as invaders and the destruction those armies wreaked
made them vandals.
CWBR: Why did Lee's campaign into Union territory failùand why were the
Confederates so much more comfortable on their side of the Potomac?
JTG: On the first major raid into Maryland in the late summer and fall,
1862, Lee's army suffered from all sorts of problems: exhaustion from extensive
campaigning and long marches, heavy losses in combat that compelled survivors
to assume greater burdens, a lack of adequate clothing and footwear, some food
shortages, disciplinary problems, and in some cases a reluctance to take the war
into enemy country. Confederate soldiers were also disappointed in the support
they received from Marylanders. And, of course, the Lost Order gave the Union
an advantage.
The movement into Pennsylvania in 1863 was more complex. Stonewall
Jackson had died, and Lee had just implemented a three-corps system. The high
command, including Lee, did not perform at a high level. Lee himself explained
to Davis that he called on his men to accomplish more than they were capable of
doing. The army had to disperse to forage; discipline declined and plundering
increased. Federals were fighting on their soil, in defense of their people, which
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made their resistance all the more intense. Despite Jed Hotchkiss's maps,
Federals had better sense of the countryside and road network. Little but
important breaks went the Federals' way. Even the fuses used to explode artillery
shells burned slower than Lee's gunners were accustomed, and rounds passed
well overhead of the vital Union position on the third day.
CWBR: Your discussion of religion and morality in army life suggests that
soldiers grappled with these issues constantly. How did the war challenge men's
beliefs about God and their moral code?
JTG: War almost always challenges religious and moral beliefs. It calls on
soldiers to cast aside traditional taboos, such as killing fellow human beings. It
brings together huge numbers of young males, many free from the constraints of
home for the first time, and it places them in situations in which life is in
jeopardy. Many of them misbehave, according to normal societal standards. Part
of it may be peer pressure; part may be a desire to live fully today because they
may not be here tomorrow; part of it may be an outlet for fears and insecurities;
and part of it is a product of their youth, their feeling of indestructibility and a
lack of respect for the full consequences of their actions.
Statistically, young adult males are the least likely group to attend religious
services. Lee's army was no different in that respect. I found that perhaps 25%
regularly attended some kind of religious services. My friend George Rable, who
is writing a major book on religion in the Civil War, finds similar levels of
participation in other armies. Yet failure to attend church or prayer meetings
regularly does not mean that soldiers neither believed in God nor drew on God in
their time of need.
Soldiers understood the precarious nature of life in the army. The only way
they could make sense of why they lived and why others alongside them fell, and
the only way they could confront the incredible danger of combat and the disease
of camp life, was to place their faith in God or fate. God alone would determine
if they should live through the battle or fall in it. Or, they might attribute survival
to mere chance. Either way, it removed the burden from their shoulders, lifted
some of the fear, and placed it with some higher power over whom they had no
control.
CWBR: States rights and localism have occupied the attention of historians 
for some time. In an interesting note, you state that this mentality actually
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benefited those suffering on the home front as the national government lost its
power and communities had to fend for themselves. How did the states rights
mentality affect the army and those at home supporting it?
JTG: Southerners had looked toward their state and local government and
community for help in time of need. That concept carried over into the
Confederacy. The war itself and the threat of Union invasion galvanized
communities. People came together to support the cause. Those who could not
serve in uniform supported others. Everyone knew servicemen. They were their
fathers, sons, relatives, and neighbors. Those away in uniform drew strength and
comfort from the notion that people left behind would help their families.
As the war dragged on into the second, third, and fourth years, the burdens
compounded. Hardships abounded; everyone knew someone who gave his life
for Confederate independence. Yet the local community was much better at
fulfilling the needs than the central Confederate government, which had no
tradition of performing those duties.
CWBR: You suggest that desertion and straggling posed a problem for the
Confederate army, especially later in the war. Did the traditional southern code
of honor become blurred on the field of battle? How did these deserting and
straggling soldiers justify their conduct and how did their comrades judge them?
JTG: Soldiers straggled for all sorts of reasons. Some were too ill or
improperly clothed to keep up; others sought a chance to forage or slip off to
home temporarily. And some dodged duty.
Desertion was a much more complicated issue. Among the components of
the concept of southern honor was certainly courage. By and large, Lee's soldiers
were excellent in combat. Lee himself believed they were the best infantrymen
in the world. But a central tenet of honor was responsibility toward one's family.
As the war dragged on and hazards and hardships in military life and on the
home front abounded, soldiers had to confront a difficult question: Where did
their ultimate loyalty rest? Was their primary responsibility to their country or to
their family? Should they continue to serve in the army when Federal armies
overran their homes, or when their families were suffering severe hardships? Or,
should they return home to care for their loved ones?
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Other times, soldiers believed that the Confederacy's inability to feed and
clothe them were signs that the Confederacy was collapsing. It made no sense to
continue the fight and to bear the burdens any longer, when the cause was
hopeless.
CWBR: Based on your study of Lee's army, how has your assessment of the
general changed and how do you seek to revise our understanding of the man?
JTG: What emerges in these pages is not so much new information about
Lee's personality; rather, it is a deeper understanding of Lee as a military man.
The Lee whom I see is one who is an excellent administrator, a general who
understands fully the kinds of sacrifices his army and the Confederate people
must make in order to win the war. The Confederacy must make up for inferior
manpower and materiel by compensating in commitment and by husbanding
precious resources. Lee was forever attempting to instill greater discipline and
alter the army culture, one based heavily on the culture that these citizen-soldiers
brought into military service. It was a culture that he inherited from his
predecessor. Unfortunately, the officer corps largely shared that culture, and his
army campaigned too frequently, endured too many hardships, and had a steady
influx of individuals from civil life, which helped to refresh that influence from
civilian culture.
Lee was, as Walter Taylor described him in a letter home, one of those rare
individuals who could fully comprehend a major military movement. By that
Taylor meant that he could plan and execute all facets of a major operation. Lee
bore the hardships and frustrations of service in the Confederacy and worked
incredible hours to provide for his men. Logistics were a continual nightmare for
him. He suffered severe health issues and was at times short of temper with his
staff. Late in the war, he assumed such heavy burdens that he slept little (for the
first three weeks of the Overland Campaign, Lee never slept more than two
consecutive hours). Losses were so heavy among the high-ranking officers that
he was army commander and had to devote enormous time to overseeing corps
and cavalry movements, tasks that corps commanders should have performed.
Lee was both a great combat commander and a talented administrator.
CWBR: Thank you.
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